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Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states
of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation
for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize
that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases
as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this
hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants
were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional
events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The
lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace
conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude,
potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for
uncertainty.
1 Introduction: Conspiratorial beliefs and er-
rors in probabilistic thinking
A conspiracy theory is a particular kind of alternative explanation for some
event or some state of affairs in the world. Conspiracy theories posit that the
“common explanation” for an event or state of affairs is false, and that, in
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Abstract
reality, individuals or organizations have caused the event or state of affairs for
nefarious reasons (Clarke, 2002; Keeley, 1999). From a purely epistemological
point of view, conspiracy theories represent beliefs that are not justified very
well, or not at all. This means that the epistemic shortcoming of conspiratorial
beliefs is not contingent on their truth status: Even though the propositional
content of conspiracy theories can be accidentally true, the way the belief in
conspiracy theories is justified is defective. In that sense, conspiracy theories’
“crippled” (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009) epistemology represents a case of the
Gettier problem (Gettier, 1963), or, more generally, a case of epistemic luck
(Pritchard, 2004).
Given the epistemic shortcoming of conspiracy theories, the prevalence of
conspiratorial thinking is somewhat surprising: Rather than being a fringe
occurrence, belief in conspiracy theories is fairly common (Oliver & Wood,
2014a, 2014b), and, furthermore, belief in conspiracy theories can affect
real-world behavior and decision-making (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, 2014a;
K. Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2015). The fact that conspiracy the-
ories are an everyday phenomenon means that accounts of conspiratorial
thinking as pathologies (Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014;
Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011) or
consequences of maladaptive traits (Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron, & Furnham,
2016) probably offer only a partial explanation. While it is possible that a
subset of conspiratorial reasoning is caused by pathologies of the mind and
anomalous personality traits, it is highly improbable that every conspiratorial
belief can be explained in this manner. A different and complementary per-
spective on conspiratorial reasoning is not one of anomaly, but of normalcy:
Conspiratorial reasoning as a consequence of general and universal cognitive
limitations (Boudry & Braeckman, 2012). From this point of view, cognitive
patterns in the context of conspiracy theories, such as the need for cognitive
closure and explanatory completeness (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska,
2017; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013; Basham, 2001), the need for making sense
of high-impact events (Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; van Prooijen & van Dijk,
2014), and the need for clear agency (K. M. Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry,
& Harvey, 2016), are not pathologies, but rather forms of cognitive heuristics,
or cognitive biases.
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1.1 Hypotheses
Cognitive biases are systematic errors in human cognition that often arise
in situations in which we need to subjectively assess probabilities, either
explicitly or implicitly (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It has been suggested
that conspiratorial thinking is a coping mechanism for uncertainty (Franks,
Bangerter, & Bauer, 2013), but, even though there is some evidence that
conspiratorial thinking is linked to errors in probabilistic thinking (Brotherton
& French, 2014; Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, Parker, & Clough, 2017), the
specific hypothesis of conspiratorial thinking as a heuristic for coping with
uncertainty has not yet been put to the empirical test. We fill this gap with
five experiments that test the following hypothesis: The lower the probability
of an event, the stronger the belief in a conspiratorial explanation of the event,
and the weaker the belief in the common explanation of the event.
In addition to our main hypothesis, we include two potential mediating
factors in our experiments. As mentioned in the previous section, there is
some evidence that conspiratorial reasoning might be more prominent when
the events in question are of higher impact for society (Leman & Cinnirella,
2007; van Prooijen & van Dijk, 2014). We include this mediating factor in our
study and hypothesize that belief in a conspiratorial explanation is stronger in
a high-impact scenario than in a low-impact scenario. We define a low-impact
event as an event that does not affect society as a whole, but only a very
small group of people.
A second potentially mediating factor is the clarity of a motive for conspira-
tors to conspire. A prominent feature of conspiracy theories and conspiratorial
arguments is intentionality, or the presence of an ulterior, yet clear motive
(Uscinski & Parent, 2014, 43). We include the presence of a clear ulterior
motive as a potential mediating factor in our study and hypothesize that
belief in a conspiratorial explanation is stronger in a scenario with a clear
ulterior motive.
2 Design, data, methods
2.1 Five experiments
We test one main and two auxiliary hypotheses, as described in the previous
section. In order to do so adequately, we conducted five separate experiments.
The first of those experiments was designed to simply test the impact of event
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probabilities. Experiments two and three test the impact of event probabilities,
and in addition, they are low-impact events either without a clear ulterior
motive (experiment two) or with a clear ulterior motive (experiment three).
Experiments four and five test the impact of event probabilities, and in
addition, they are high-impact events either without a clear ulterior motive
(experiment four) or with a clear ulterior motive (experiment five)
2.2 Recruitment of participants
Participants for the experiments presented in this paper were recruited on
the crowdsourcing platform Clickworker (Lutz, 2015). Each participant was
remunerated with e0.15 for completing a short survey that was the experiment.
All five experiments were designed to take around one minute to complete.
The experiments were conducted with version 2.63.1 of the open-source survey
software LimeSurvey (LimeSurvey Project Team / Carsten Schmitz, 2012).
For experiment one (two experimental groups), we commissioned 250
surveys, and for experiments two to five (five experimental groups), 500
surveys per experiment. Our goal was to have, on average, 100 participants
per experimental condition. For experiment one, we over-recruited experiment
participants, because it was not entirely clear whether only completed surveys
were considered part of the commissioned quota, or whether incomplete
surveys also counted towards it. When it became obvious during experiment
one that only completed surveys counted towards the commissioned quota,
we decided not to over-recruit for experiments two and three. The numbers
of completed surveys slightly diverge from the commissioned numbers. For
experiment one, 244 instead of 250 surveys were completed; for experiment
two, exactly 500; for experiment three, 504; for experiment four, 502; and for
experiment five, 504. The crowdsourcing platform that we worked with thus
has some imprecision in terms of commissioned vs. completed surveys, but
the differences are within a ±2.5% range.
2.3 Design of experiment one: The lottery
We have conducted five experiments in order to test the impact of probabilistic
information on conspiratorial reasoning. For experiment one, 244 participants
(65% women, mean age = 34.8, SD = 11.9) were randomly assigned to two
groups: 121 participants were assigned to the first group, and 123 participants
were assigned to the second group. The participants in the first group were
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exposed to the following text:
John decides to buy a lottery ticket. In order to win the
jackpot, John needs to choose 6 numbers correctly.
The next day, the lottery numbers are drawn: John has
0 correct numbers. Next week, John decides to buy a new
lottery ticket. When the new numbers are drawn, John ends up
with 0 correct numbers again.
The statistical probability of ending up with 0 correct
numbers two weeks in a row is around 19%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...John was simply unlucky?
...the lottery was manipulated?
The order of the two questions at the end was randomized. The partici-
pants in the second group were exposed to the following text:
John decides to buy a lottery ticket. In order to win the
jackpot, John needs to choose 6 numbers correctly. The
next day, the lottery numbers are drawn: John has 6 correct
numbers -- he has won the jackpot.
Next week, John decides to buy a new lottery ticket. When
the new numbers are drawn, John ends up with 6 correct
numbers -- he has won the jackpot again.
The statistical probability of ending up with 6 correct
numbers two weeks in a row is around 0.0000000000005%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...John was simply lucky?
...the lottery was manipulated?
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As in the first group, the order of the two questions at the end was
randomized. After answering the questions about how likey they though it
was that John was (un-)lucky and how likely they though it was that the
lottery was manipulated, participants in both groups were asked to provide
information on their gender, their age, and their country of residence. For
the sake of simplicity, the gender options were female and male only. The
probabilities of 19% in experiment one and 0.0000000000005% in experiment
two are derived from a simple lottery setup with 49 numbers in total.
2.4 Design of experiment two: Falling roof tile (low
impact, lack of clear ulterior motive)
For experiment two, 500 participants (64% women, mean age = 34.2, SD =
12.1) were randomly assigned to five groups: 82 participants were assigned to
the first group, 105 to the second group, 101 to the third group, 108 to the
fourth group, and 104 to the fifth group. The participants in all groups were
exposed to a nearly identical text. The only difference, marked here as XX%,
was the probabilistic information that each group received about the event in
question:
John is walking down the street. It’s a windy day.
As he is walking, a roof tile suddenly hits John on the head.
According to roofers (experts in roof tiles), the probability
that a roof tile comes loose on a windy day is XX%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...the tile hit John by accident?
...someone dropped the tile on John’s head on purpose?
The order of the two questions was randomized. In the text for the first
group, the probability of a roof tile coming loose was presented to be 1%. In
the second group, that probability was 25%; in the third group, it was 50%; in
the fourth group, it was 75%; in the fifth group, it was 99%. As in experiment
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one, participants in both groups were asked to provide information on their
gender, their age, and their country of residence upon answering the two
questions about the common and the conspiratorial explanation. For the sake
of simplicity, the gender options were female and male only.
Experiment two is a low-impact scenario (John being hit on the head is
not of general concern for society), and the story lacks a clear ulterior motive.
2.5 Design of experiment three: Falling roof tile (low
impact, clear ulterior motive)
For experiment three, 504 participants (61% women, mean age = 33.4, SD =
12.2) were randomly assigned to five groups: 101 participants were assigned
to the first group, 91 to the second group, 103 to the third group, 108 to the
fourth group, and 101 to the fifth group. As in experiment two, participants in
all groups were exposed to a nearly identical text. The only difference, marked
here as XX%, was the probabilistic information that each group received about
the event in question:
John has recently broken up with his girlfriend. His
girlfriend was very angry when John broke up with her.
One windy day, John is walking down the street. A man stops
John and asks him for directions. While John is explaining
the directions to the man, a roof tile suddenly hits John on
the head.
According to roofers (experts in roof tiles), the probability
that a roof tile comes loose on a windy day is XX%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...the tile hit John by accident?
...the man who stopped John did so on purpose so that John’s
ex-girlfriend could attack John with the roof tile?
The order of the two questions was randomized. The probabilistic informa-
tion for the five groups is the same as in experiment two. As in experiments
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one and two, participants in both groups were asked to provide information
on their gender, their age, and their country of residence upon answering the
two questions about the common and the conspiratorial explanation. For the
sake of simplicity, the gender options were female and male only.
Experiment three is a low-impact scenario (John being hit on the head
is not of general concern for society), just as experiment two. However,
experiment three contains a clear ulterior motive.
2.6 Design of experiment four: Deceased journalist
(high impact, lack of clear ulterior motive)
For experiment four, 504 participants (63% women, mean age = 33.4, SD =
12.0) were randomly assigned to five different groups: 90 participants were
assigned to the first group, 105 to the second group, 90 to the third group, 96
to the fourth group, and 123 to the fifth group. Much as in experiments two
and three, the participants in all groups of experiment three were exposed to a
nearly identical text. The only difference, marked as XX%, was the probabilistic
information that each group received:
John is an accomplished journalist. He is found dead in his
apartment: He died of a heart attack, officials declared.
According to doctors, the probability that someone like John
dies of a heart attack is XX%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...John really suffered a heart attack?
...John did not really suffer a heart attack, but that he was
actually murdered?
The order of the two questions was randomized. In the text for the first
group, the probability of “someone like John” to die of a heart attack was
presented to be 1%. The second group, that probability was 25%; in the third
group, it was 50%; in the fourth group, it was 75%; in the fifth group, it was
99%. As in experiments one, two, and three, participants in both groups were
asked to provide information on their gender, their age, and their country
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of residence upon answering the two questions about the common and the
conspiratorial explanation. For the sake of simplicity, the gender options were
female and male only.
Experiment four is a scenario with a high-impact story, the death and
potential murder of a journalist, but there is no clear ulterior motive provided
in the story.
2.7 Design of experiment five: Deceased journalist (high
impact, clear ulterior motive)
For experiment five, 502 participants (64% women, mean age = 34.0, SD =
12.1) were randomly assigned to five different groups: 103 participants were
assigned to the first group, 99 to the second group, 91 to the third group, 124
to the fourth group, and 85 to the fifth group. Once again, the participants
in all groups of experiment five were exposed to a nearly identical text. The
only difference, marked as XX%, was the probabilistic information that each
group received:
John is an accomplished journalist who is critical of the
government. He has just published an article where he
exposed a big corruption scandal in the government.
A day after the article has been published, John is found
dead in his apartment: He died of a heart attack, officials
declared.
According to doctors, the probability that someone like John
dies of a heart attack is XX%.
What do you think: How likely is it, from 0 (not at all
likely) to 10 (very likely), that...
...John really suffered a heart attack?
...John did not really suffer a heart attack, but that he was
actually murdered by the government?
The order of the two questions was randomized. The probabilistic informa-
tion for the five groups is the same as in experiment four. As in experiments
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one to four, participants in both groups were asked to provide information on
their gender, their age, and their country of residence upon answering the
two questions about the common and the conspiratorial explanation. For the
sake of simplicity, the gender options were female and male only.
Experiment five is a scenario with a high-impact story, the death and
potential murder of a journalist, in combination with a clear motive, the
government silencing a prominent critic.
2.8 Data analysis and researcher degrees of freedom
In any empirical scientific context, so-called researcher degrees of freedom
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) are a challenge. Researcher degrees of
freedom describe the fact that between the start of the data collection and the
reporting of results, researchers can make and have to make many decisions
that determine the final reported results. Unfortunately, many of those
decisions are not made a priori, but rather during and after the collection
of the data. The general problem with researcher degrees of freedom is that
researchers have intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to engage in so-called data
dredging (Smith & Ebrahim, 2002) and p-hacking (Head, Holman, Lanfear,
Kahn, & Jennions, 2015), and even in HARKing (Kerr, 1998) (hypothesizing
after the results are known). p-hacking and HARKing are (at the very least)
borderline unethical, but the problem of research degrees of freedom is present
event when researchers don’t actively and knowingly engage in practices such
as p-hacking (Gelman & Loken, 2013).
In our analysis, we have actively sought to minimize researcher degrees of
freedom and, where degrees of freedom are present, to make rational decisions.
Researcher degrees of freedom in our three experiments pertain to three
dimensions: Experiment design, data preparation, and data analysis.
In terms of experiment design, we have made the conscious decision to limit
the data collected in the three experiment to precisely the data that is reported:
The answers to the two main questions, and, in addition, information on
participants’ gender, age, and country of residence. We did not collect any
additional data – the studies reported here are not, for example, only one
part of a larger data set that will be used for additional publications.
In terms of data preparation, we have included all completed surveys into
our data analyses. We did not exclude any cases.
In terms of data analysis, we have made two decisions. First, we are
only looking at what is sometimes referred to as “main effects”: We did
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not estimate any form of interaction effects, and we did not partition data
into gender, age, or any other kind of sub-groups. We are simply estimating
the data in its most direct form, because that is what we are interested
in given our hypothesis. Furthermore, rather than engage in frequentist
“significance testing”, we are estimating means with the help of Bayesian
estimation. Epistemologically, Bayesian estimation is attractive because it
is a quantification of uncertainty that does not rely on a test statistic. The
models we estimate are all of the following form:
y ∼ t(µ, σ, ν)
µ ∼ N (5, 5)
σ ∼ Cauchy(0, 2)
ν ∼ Gamma(2, 0.1)
The models are estimated using the probabilistic modeling environment
Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) from within the statistical environment R (R
Core Team, 2017). The modeling approach we use is a generalized version of
a “robust” estimation of means whereby the Student’s t distribution is used
as the sampling distribution (Kruschke, 2013; Lange, Little, & Taylor, 1989).
The models were estimated by running 4000 warmup and 4000 sampling
iterations with three chains. The estimates converged well, as indicated by
potential scale reduction factors (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) of Rˆ = 1.
The model contains three parameters that are specified with priors; these
priors represent researcher degrees of freedom. We have specified the prior
for the mean µ as a normal distribution with mean 5 and standard deviation
5. Given the scale of the data y (0 - 10), the prior for µ is a rather simple
very broad prior. The second parameter in the model, σ, is modeled as a
half-Cauchy distribution (a Cauchy distribution truncated at 0) with scale
2. The half-Cauchy prior is a vaguely informative prior recommended for
variance parameters (Polson & Scott, 2012). Finally, the normality parameter
ν that governs the heaviness of the tails in the t distribution is modeled as a
Gamma distribution with shape 2 and scale 0.1, which represents a vaguely
informative prior (Jua´rez & Steel, 2010). The Bayesian modeling approach,
then, does introduce additional researcher degrees of freedom, but since we
are using the same specifications for all models, this means that we are not,
for example, arbitrarily changing priors in order to create results that fit our
hypothesis. Furthermore, we are consistently using vague priors, meaning
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that the data has much greater say than the likelihood. A practical benefit
of the Bayesian approach is that it eliminates incentives for p-hacking: There
are no p-values, and, therefore, there are no “significant” or “not significant”
results in the sense of rules of thumb such as p < 0.05 equals “statistically
significant”.
We have sought to minimize researcher degrees of freedom and to make
rational decisions in those degrees of freedom that are present in our data
analysis. In addition, all of our raw, unaltered data will be made available
via the Open Science Framework.
3 Results
3.1 Experiment one: The lottery
The estimation results for experiment one are summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Estimated means for the responses in the two groups (conditions)
of experiment one. The estimates for the common explanation are red, and the
estimates for the conspiratorial explanation are blue.
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The violin plots in Figure 1 are visualizations of the posterior distribution
of the estimated means for the two questions in each group. As can be
plainly seen from Figure 1, the estimated means for the two groups are
very different. The group that was exposed to the story about John losing
twice very strongly believes in the common explanation (luck), and only
very weakly in the conspiratorial explanation (manipulation). The situation
is quite different in the group that read about John winning twice: The
estimated means are very close to each other. The belief in the conspiratorial
explanation (manipulation) is much stronger than is the case in the first
group; so much so that there is no overlap between the posterior distribution
for the conspiratorial explanation (manipulation) between the groups. This
means that the true mean is almost certainly lower in the first, (relatively)
high probability group (John losing twice) than in the second, low probability
group (John winning twice). The same is true for the means of the common
explanation (luck): The posterior distributions of the means of the two groups
do not overlap, and, therefore, the real mean is almost certainly higher in the
first group than in the second group.
The parameter estimates for experiment one are summarized in tabular
form in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the parameter estimates of experiment one.
Parameter Condition Explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ two losses common 8.96 8.58 9.3 1
σ two losses common 1.27 0.96 1.66 1
ν two losses common 1.97 1.25 3.17 1
µ two losses conspiratorial 0.77 0.44 1.29 1
σ two losses conspiratorial 1.15 0.79 1.77 1
ν two losses conspiratorial 1.62 1.05 3.09 1
µ two wins common 5.62 4.94 6.31 1
σ two wins common 3.69 3.25 4.2 1
ν two wins common 34.95 12.81 73.81 1
µ two wins conspiratorial 4.77 4.1 5.43 1
σ two wins conspiratorial 3.64 3.21 4.15 1
ν two wins conspiratorial 35.22 12.9 73.86 1
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3.2 Experiment two: Falling roof tile (low impact, lack
of clear ulterior motive)
The results of the estimates for experiment two are summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Estimated means for the responses in the five groups (conditions)
of experiment two. The estimates for the common explanation are red, and the
estimates for the conspiratorial explanation are blue.
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The participants in all five groups clearly believe that the common expla-
nation is much more probable than the conspiratorial one. However, the trend
of the means for both explanations is one consistent with our hypothesis: The
lower the alleged probability of the event, the higher, on average, the belief
in the conspiratorial explanation (attack), and the lower the belief in the
common explanation (accident). There is some overlap of the distributions
of the 1% and of the 99% groups for both questions. This means that it is
possible that the true trend of the means between the very low probability
and the very high probability group is, in fact, flat or even opposite from what
it appears to be visually. Since the distributions in Figure 2 are empirical
in nature, we can quantify that probability. The probability that the means
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of the 1% and 99% groups for the common explanation (accident) lie within
the band of overlapping areas is 0.18, and the probability that the trend of
the two means, were they to lie in that band of overlapping areas, is either
flat or negative is 0.09. Similarly, the probability that the means of the 1%
and 99% groups for the conspiratorial explanation (attack) lie within the
band of overlapping areas is 0.20, and the probability that the trend of the
two means, were they to lie in within the band of overlapping areas, is either
flat or negative is 0.03. Overall, then, the probability that the trends of the
means between the very low probability and the very high probability group
actually behave as hypothesized is high.
The parameter estimates for the common explanation in experiment two
are summarized in tabular form in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of the parameter estimates for the common explanation in
experiment two.
Parameter Condition Explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% common 7.37 6.67 8.08 1
σ 1% common 2.78 2.24 3.33 1
ν 1% common 22.52 4.43 58.35 1
µ 25% common 7.83 7.25 8.55 1
σ 25% common 2.3 1.51 2.79 1
ν 25% common 18.47 2.2 53.79 1
µ 50% common 8.1 7.66 8.56 1
σ 50% common 1.94 1.57 2.31 1
ν 50% common 17.63 4.02 49.07 1
µ 75% common 8.57 8.21 8.91 1
σ 75% common 1.37 1.05 1.76 1
ν 75% common 3.98 1.91 8.95 1
µ 99% common 9.19 8.88 9.46 1
σ 99% common 1 0.74 1.34 1
ν 99% common 1.99 1.22 3.34 1
The parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation in experiment
two are summarized in tabular form in Table 3.
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Table 3: Summary of the parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation
in experiment two.
Parameter Condition Explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% conspiratorial 2.6 1.6 3.38 1
σ 1% conspiratorial 2.64 1.59 3.32 1
ν 1% conspiratorial 17.68 1.87 53.15 1
µ 25% conspiratorial 2.29 1.67 2.87 1
σ 25% conspiratorial 2.17 1.5 2.67 1
ν 25% conspiratorial 15.09 2.34 48.88 1
µ 50% conspiratorial 1.96 1.49 2.41 1
σ 50% conspiratorial 2.01 1.62 2.39 1
ν 50% conspiratorial 18.65 4.23 50.42 1
µ 75% conspiratorial 1.45 1.13 1.79 1
σ 75% conspiratorial 1.25 0.93 1.6 1
ν 75% conspiratorial 3.15 1.62 6.05 1
µ 99% conspiratorial 1 0.66 1.41 1
σ 99% conspiratorial 1.19 0.83 1.64 1
ν 99% conspiratorial 2.19 1.23 4.23 1
3.3 Experiment three: Falling roof tile (low impact,
clear ulterior motive)
The results of the estimates for experiment three are summarized in Figure 3.
In comparison with the estimates for experiment two, the participants in
experiment three have stronger beliefs in the conspiratorial explanation when
presented with lower alleged probabilities. The difference in results between
experiments two and three suggests that the presence of a clear ulterior motive
has, ex expected, a mediating effect on conspiratorial belief. The overall
trend of the estimated between conditions is not as smooth as in experiment
two. However, neither the estimated distribution for the common nor for
the conspiratorial explanation have any overlap between the 1% and the
99% groups, which suggests that the real trend of the means is as predicted
between the very low probability and the very high probability groups.
The parameter estimates for the common explanation in experiment three
are summarized in tabular form in Table 4.
The parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation in experiment
three are summarized in tabular form in Table 5.
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Figure 3: Estimated means for the responses in the five groups (conditions) of
experiment three. The estimates for the common explanation are red, and the
estimates for the conspiratorial explanation are blue.
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3.4 Experiment four: Deceased journalist (high im-
pact, lack of clear ulterior motive)
The results of the estimates for experiment four are summarized in Figure 4.
The trends for the estimated means of the belief in the common explanation
(heart attack) and for the conspiratorial explanation (murder) in experiment
four follow the pattern as predicted by our main hypothesis: The lower the
alleged probability of the event, the stronger the belief in a conspiratorial
explanation and the weaker the belief in the common explanation. As there
is no overlap between the distributions of the 1% and the 99% groups,
neither for the conspiratorial nor for the common explanation, the true
trend between these two means cannot be flat or negative. In comparison
to experiments two and three, the belief in the conspiratorial explanation is
notably stronger (in the low probability groups). This lends support to the
auxiliary hypothesis that a high-impact event increases the endorsment of
17
Table 4: Summary of the parameter estimates for the common explanation in
experiment three.
Parameter Condition Explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% common 5.59 4.88 6.31 1
σ 1% common 3.53 3.06 4.06 1
ν 1% common 33.28 11.7 72.28 1
µ 25% common 7.43 6.77 8.09 1
σ 25% common 2.9 2.45 3.41 1
ν 25% common 26.53 6.81 63.49 1
µ 50% common 7.39 6.86 7.91 1
σ 50% common 2.4 2 2.83 1
ν 50% common 21.55 5.32 54.66 1
µ 75% common 8.51 7.93 8.95 1
σ 75% common 1.62 1.16 2.32 1
ν 75% common 3.44 1.5 10.47 1
µ 99% common 9.24 8.96 9.5 1
σ 99% common 0.96 0.72 1.24 1
ν 99% common 1.53 1.08 2.25 1
conspiratorial explanations.
The parameter estimates for the common explanation in experiment four
are summarized in tabular form in Table 6.
The parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation in experiment
four are summarized in tabular form in Table 7.
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Table 5: Summary of the parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation
in experiment three.
Parameter Condition Explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% conspiratorial 3.33 2.63 4.04 1
σ 1% conspiratorial 3.4 2.94 3.93 1
ν 1% conspiratorial 31.18 9.89 69.97 1
µ 25% conspiratorial 2.5 1.86 3.12 1
σ 25% conspiratorial 2.78 2.36 3.26 1
ν 25% conspiratorial 27.19 7.58 64.17 1
µ 50% conspiratorial 2.4 1.89 2.92 1
σ 50% conspiratorial 2.45 2.06 2.85 1
ν 50% conspiratorial 24.48 6.17 59.99 1
µ 75% conspiratorial 1.21 0.8 1.72 1
σ 75% conspiratorial 1.48 1.06 2.01 1
ν 75% conspiratorial 4.35 1.69 14.51 1
µ 99% conspiratorial 0.67 0.4 0.97 1
σ 99% conspiratorial 0.95 0.7 1.3 1
ν 99% conspiratorial 1.38 1.02 2.04 1
3.5 Experiment five: Deceased journalist (high impact,
clear ulterior motive)
The results of the estimates for experiment three are summarized in Figure 5.
The overall trend of the estimated means once again follows the predicted
pattern: The lower the alleged probability of the event, the stronger the belief
in the conspiratorial and the weaker the belief in the common explanation.
The estimated means of the 1% and the 99% groups partly overlap. While
there is no overlap for the common explanation, there is some overlap for the
conspiratorial explanation. The probability that the means lie in this band of
area overlap is 0.19, and the probability that the trend of the means, were
they to actually lie in that band of area overlap, is flat or positive is 0.01.
It is therefore highly probable that the real trend of the means is negative.
In comparison with the estimation results for experiment four, the overall
belief in the conspiratorial explanation is much stronger. This lends further
support to the auxiliary hypothesis that a clear ulterior motive increases the
endorsement of conspiratorial beliefs. Within experiments two to five, the
levels of conspiratorial belief are strongest in experiment five. This suggests
that, as expected, conspiratorial beliefs are strongest in a high-impact, clear
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Figure 4: Estimated means for the responses in the five groups (conditions) of
experiment four. The estimates for the common explanation are red, and the
estimates for the conspiratorial explanation are blue.
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ulterior motive scenario.
The parameter estimates for the common explanation in experiment five
are summarized in tabular form in Table 8.
The parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation in experiment
five are summarized in tabular form in Table 9.
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Table 6: Summary of the parameter estimates for the common explanation in
experiment four.
condition explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% common 4.4 3.69 5.13 1
σ 1% common 3.25 2.8 3.79 1
ν 1% common 30.87 9.92 68.22 1
µ 25% common 6.32 5.84 6.8 1
σ 25% common 2.38 2.05 2.75 1
ν 25% common 28.02 8.51 65.07 1
µ 50% common 6.87 6.37 7.38 1
σ 50% common 2.28 1.94 2.69 1
ν 50% common 24.29 6.62 59.59 1
µ 75% common 8.08 7.76 8.4 1
σ 75% common 1.47 1.21 1.75 1
ν 75% common 18.65 4.55 51.09 1
µ 99% common 8.98 8.45 9.32 1
σ 99% common 1.24 0.85 1.89 1
ν 99% common 1.92 1.09 4.19 1
Table 7: Summary of the parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation
in experiment four.
condition explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% conspiratorial 5.21 4.53 5.9 1
σ 1% conspiratorial 3.11 2.68 3.62 1
ν 1% conspiratorial 30.34 9.84 68.09 1
µ 25% conspiratorial 3.46 2.94 3.97 1
σ 25% conspiratorial 2.57 2.23 2.96 1
ν 25% conspiratorial 27.93 8.7 64.55 1
µ 50% conspiratorial 2.82 2.32 3.3 1
σ 50% conspiratorial 2.2 1.88 2.58 1
ν 50% conspiratorial 26.63 7.7 62.38 1
µ 75% conspiratorial 2.07 1.6 2.57 1
σ 75% conspiratorial 1.78 1.28 2.26 1
ν 75% conspiratorial 9.97 2.29 36.23 1
µ 99% conspiratorial 1.27 0.87 2.09 1
σ 99% conspiratorial 1.39 0.88 2.39 1
ν 99% conspiratorial 2.27 1.06 7.67 1
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Figure 5: Estimated means for the responses in the five groups (conditions)
of experiment five. The estimates for the common explanation are red, and the
estimates for the conspiratorial explanation are blue.
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Table 8: Summary of the parameter estimates for the common explanation in
experiment five.
condition explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% common 3.34 2.79 3.91 1
σ 1% common 2.74 2.35 3.19 1
ν 1% common 26.99 7.73 62.75 1
µ 25% common 4.05 3.48 4.63 1
σ 25% common 2.79 2.4 3.24 1
ν 25% common 29.19 8.85 66.15 1
µ 50% common 5.02 4.4 5.65 1
σ 50% common 2.87 2.46 3.36 1
ν 50% common 28.62 8.58 66 1
µ 75% common 5.45 4.93 5.96 1
σ 75% common 2.79 2.43 3.19 1
ν 75% common 31.21 10.06 70.36 1
µ 99% common 6 5.36 6.64 1
σ 99% common 2.83 2.41 3.34 1
ν 99% common 28.03 7.97 65.05 1
Table 9: Summary of the parameter estimates for the conspiratorial explanation
in experiment five.
condition explanation mean 2.5% 97.5% Rˆ
µ 1% conspiratorial 6.68 6.15 7.23 1
σ 1% conspiratorial 2.61 2.23 3.04 1
ν 1% conspiratorial 26.26 7.32 62.6 1
µ 25% conspiratorial 5.93 5.38 6.48 1
σ 25% conspiratorial 2.69 2.31 3.13 1
ν 25% conspiratorial 28.82 8.87 64.64 1
µ 50% conspiratorial 5.32 4.65 5.98 1
σ 50% conspiratorial 3.06 2.63 3.58 1
ν 50% conspiratorial 30.14 9.6 67.13 1
µ 75% conspiratorial 5.36 4.82 5.89 1
σ 75% conspiratorial 2.87 2.52 3.27 1
ν 75% conspiratorial 32.41 11.22 69.32 1
µ 99% conspiratorial 4.54 5.89 5.89 1
σ 99% conspiratorial 2.62 3.6 3.6 1
ν 99% conspiratorial 9.74 67.4 67.4 1
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4 Discussion
4.1 Limitations of this study
Besides the general limitations of any singular study (the main hypothe-
sis needs to be further explored and the experiments replicated), we sus-
pect that the framing of our experiments biased participants’ responses.
More specifically, we have presented the alleged probabilities for events as
Pr(event | chance). The participants were asked to estimate Pr(chance |
event) and Pr(conspiracy | event). It is possible that some or even all par-
ticipants have simply interpreted Pr(event | chance) as Pr(chance | event)
and Pr(conspiracy | event) as 1− Pr(event | chance). Even though both of
those deductions are incorrect, the framing of the experiments might have
nudged the participants towards such an interpretation. Future research
on the relationship between probability and conspiratorial thinking should
therefore be designed in a way that avoids this potential bias.
4.2 Conspiratorial thinking as a possible cognitive heuris-
tic
Overall, the five experiments lend support to the hypothesis we set out to test:
The lower the probability of an event, the stronger the belief in a conspiratorial
explanation, and the weaker the belief in the common explanation. In addition,
the results suggest that high-impact scenarios as well as scenarios with clear
ulterior motives induce stronger belief in conspiratorial explanations. These
results are not all that surprising in light of what is known about how humans
handle probabilities: A number of cognitive biases are, in essence, errors
in probabilistic thinking, and conspiratorial reasoning might represent just
another such bias. For example, we know that humans tend to have a
difficult time with handling low probability events, especially if the events in
question have both low probability and high impact; this trait is sometimes
described with the black swan metaphor (Taleb, 2010; Wardman & Mythen,
2016). In this context, conspiratorial thinking as a potential cognitive bias
might represent a general strategy for handling probabilistic information, or,
expressed more generally, a coping strategy for uncertainty, since probability
is a quantification of uncertainty.
If conspiratorial thinking occurs as a general cognitive bias and not only as
a pathology of the mind, that means that it might also be possible to devise
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countermeasures against conspiratorial thinking that have an effect of gener-
alized debiasing (Croskerry, Singhal, & Mamede, 2013; Lilienfeld, Ammirati,
& Landfield, 2009). In order to tackle specific singular conspiracy theories,
“debunking” them might work. In order to tackle conspiratorial thinking in
general, metacognitive debiasing as a form of training in probabilistic thinking
might be more effective.
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